Lars Karstrup to step down - what does it mean for Singapore's PIL?
Pacific International Lines is preparing for a potentially significant leadership transition, after announcing that chief executive Lars Kastrup (above, right) is to step down and be replaced by Wan Chee Foong (above, left), currently MD, corporate strategy, at Temasek International, PIL's owner.
The Singapore-headquartered carrier announced the moves at an internal company meeting this week, and yesterday confirmed a six-month transition process, Mr Wan initially serving as deputy CEO from next month. He will formally take the reins in April 2027, in what keen observers of the company believe is "more than a routine CEO handover".
Mr Kastrup is fundamentally a liner shipping operator, while Mr Wan is an investor, strategist, infrastructure executive, and M&A practitioner, whose career has moved repeatedly between Temasek and its port operator subsidiary, PSA.
As a result, the key question may not simply be who runs PIL next, but what PIL next becomes.
From survival to a range of options
Mr Kastrup joined PIL in 2020, when the carrier was facing an existential financial crisis.
The company ultimately underwent a $3.3bn restructuring supported by Heliconia Capital Management and backed by Temasek. The rescue included up to $600m in new financing, with the shareholders heavily diluted.
Mr Kastrup moved from senior adviser to co-president, and became CEO in 2022; his background made him particularly suited to the task - before PIL, he held senior positions at Maersk, CMA CGM, and NOL/APL, later moving into strategy, M&A, terminals, vessels, and logistics within the CMA CGM group.
The result was a striking transformation: PIL reported $1.04bn in net profit for 2025, with EBITDA of $1.5bn, and volumes of 2.58m teu. It ended the year with $2.74bn in cash and deposits, and a net cash position.
The fleet has also been rebuilt. Since 2022, PIL has commissioned 28 LNG dual-fuel vessels, including eight more 13,000 teu ships ordered this year.
This is no longer a distressed carrier dependent on rescue capital, it is a financially healthy shipping company with options, and that makes the choice of successor unusually interesting.
Why Wan Chee Foong matters
Mr Wan is not a conventional liner shipping appointment.
He spent years at Temasek focusing on transportation and logistics investments before becoming regional CEO for the Middle East and South Asia and head of group business development at PIL.
He later became CEO of PSA BDP, following PSA's acquisition of US freight forwarder BDP International, a transaction central to PSA's expansion beyond ports, deeper into logistics and supply chain management.
His experience in investment management, infrastructure, logistics, M&A, and corporate strategy suggests a very different kind of mandate from Mr Kastrup's, whose task was largely operational and financial restructuring. Mr Wan's could be about capital allocation and strategic direction.
Should PIL remain a predominantly liner shipping business? Should it move further into logistics? Should it acquire other companies? Could new investors be introduced? Could PIL eventually be listed? Or might consolidation with a larger carrier create more value?
These are not merely operational questions, they are portfolio issues.
Ownership structure matters
Temasek's relationship with PIL is also more nuanced than the simple statement that "Temasek owns PIL".
In 2021, Heliconia emerged from the restructuring with a majority economic position.
But a June 2026 Australian competition filing described Temasek as having a 32% indirect look-through interest in PIL through a fund managed by Heliconia Capital Management.
That does not necessarily mean control has changed - cconomic ownership, voting control, and fund structures can differ significantly - but the wording is important.
Heliconia now sits within the broader 65 Equity Partners ecosystem, which focuses on established businesses, capital restructuring, M&A, and shareholder liquidity.
That does not prove that PIL is being prepared for sale, but it does mean PIL should be viewed partly through the lens of investment lifecycle and capital allocation, not only national shipping strategy.
The ghost of NOL
Meanwhile, comparisons with Neptune Orient Lines are difficult to avoid.
In 2011, NOL appointed Ng Yat Chung, then a senior Temasek executive, as CEO. Mr Ng first joined the board and worked alongside outgoing CEO Ron Widdows during a handover before taking over.
Four years later, Temasek agreed to sell its majority stake in NOL to CMA CGM.
However, the comparison has limits.
NOL in 2015 was struggling. Its reported $707m profit was largely driven by an $888m gain from the sale of APL Logistics. Excluding that gain, the group remained loss-making.
PIL today is in a very different position.
CMA CGM also did not simply acquire NOL at a giveaway price. Its offer represented a substantial premium to the market price. The more relevant point is that CMA CGM bought NOL near a weak point in the container shipping cycle after years of poor underlying returns.
The historical parallel is, therefore, not that a Temasek executive necessarily presages a sale, but it does show how willing Temasek has been to reconsider long-term ownership of major Singapore shipping assets when circumstances change.
There is also an unusual circularity.
Mr Kastrup himself became CEO of NOL/APL after CMA CGM acquired the company. He later moved into strategy and M&A at CMA CGM before eventually joining PIL and helping rebuild it.
Now another Temasek strategist will inherit the company from him.
A sale is only one possible outcome
The mistake would be to assume that Mr Wan's arrival means PIL is being prepared for sale. There is currently no public evidence of such a process.
In fact, PIL's investment programme suggests the opposite. The company continues to order ships, launch services, and reinforce its network across Asia, Africa, India, Latin America, and Oceania.
Several strategic outcomes remain possible:
PIL could stay independent and focus on becoming a stronger niche global carrier;
It could expand into logistics and inland services, using elements of the PSA BDP model;
It could become an acquirer itself, buying agencies, logistics businesses, or regional assets.
Its shareholders could also seek partial monetisation through an IPO, minority investment, or recapitalisation without selling the entire company.
And, eventually, PIL could become attractive to another major carrier - and, of those possible buyers:
ONE would be particularly interesting because of its Singapore base, growth ambitions, and network complementarity;
CMA CGM would create an irresistible historical parallel, although it already overlaps heavily with PIL in several markets;
Hapag-Lloyd is less obvious in the short term, because of its ongoing Zim transaction.
But an outright sale is not the only - or necessarily most likely - strategic endgame.
The real question
The most important change at PIL may therefore not be the identity of its next CEO. It may be the nature of the problem that CEO is being asked to solve.
When Mr Kastrup arrived, the challenge was survival.
Today, PIL is profitable, cash-rich, renewing its fleet, and expanding its network. It no longer suffers from a lack of options.
It has several.
And so, while Mr Kastrup's chapter was about rebuilding the company, Wan Chee Foong may be inheriting a more complicated task: deciding what to do with the value which that rebuilding created.
